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Abstract—In this paper, through considering lightweight cryp-
tography, we present a comparative realization of MDS matrices
used in the VLSI implementations of lightweight cryptography.
We verify the MixColumn/MixNibble transformation using MDS
matrices and propose reliability approaches for thwarting natural
and malicious faults. We note that one other contribution of this
work is to consider not only linear error detecting codes but also
recomputation mechanisms as well as fault space transformation
(FST) adoption for lightweight cryptographic algorithms. Our
intention in this paper is to propose reliability and error detection
mechanisms (through linear codes, recomputations, and FST
adopted for lightweight cryptography) to consider the error
detection schemes in designing beforehand taking into account
such algorithmic security. We also posit that the MDS matrices
applied in the MixColumn (or MixNibble) transformation of
ciphers to protect ciphers against linear and differential attacks
should be incorporated in the cipher design in order to reduce
the overhead of the applied error detection schemes. Finally,
we present a comparative implementation framework on ASIC
to benchmark the VLSI hardware implementation presented in
this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research on error detection of primitives in the hardware
VLSI structures of cryptographic algorithms has been center of
attention in prior work [1]-[11]. In addition, cipher designers
construct the MixColumn transformation by a linear diffusion
layer with maximum branch number, known as maximal
distance separable (MDS) matrices. We also mention that
the MDS matrices applied in the MixColumn (or MixNibble)
transformation of ciphers to protect ciphers against linear and
differential attacks should be incorporated in the cipher design
in order to reduce the overhead of the applied error detection
schemes.
To motivate the urgency of embedding error detection as
part of the design cycle, we briefly go over the complications
of adopting fault FST method for lightweight ciphers (it is a
motivation to our proposed criteria in the following sections
in terms of utilizing MDS matrices as the mapping function).
This method which suggests a generic FST mapping for
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data storage during encryption/decryption operations of AES-
like ciphers increases the security of expensive redundancy
countermeasures against fault attacks [6]. FST is utilized to
make “fault collision” difficult during attacks on the classic
redundancy-based countermeasures, i.e., the adversary would
have challenge in injecting same fault in the storage registers
having both original and spatial/time redundancy structures.
The countermeasures based on recomputations could fail to
detect the occurrence of a fault as long as the adversary
could inject the same fault in both the original and redun-
dant computations (biased fault model makes it easier). The
countermeasures based on recomputations can be used in
conjunction with encoding schemes which nullify the effect
of the bias in the fault model by FST, thwarting both these
attack schemes.
To investigate the importance of using/reusing MDS ma-
trices in lightweight block ciphers, we have applied this
method to the KLEIN cipher. Implementing the “naive” spatial
redundancy of KLEIN, we need 232 occupied slices on Virtex-
7 (xc7vx330t) with high area overhead. Moreover, we have
implemented the spatial redundancy with FST method that
applies MixNibble as a mapping function W through this
redundancy and using InvMixNibble as its inverse W−1. We
note that although KLEIN allows two types of decryption
through (a) using encryption transformations but utilizing
modes of operations and (b) reverse transformations, this
might not be the case for other lightweight block ciphers and
that adds to the complications of using FST in lightweight
cryptography. Our implementations show that higher area,
i.e., 239 occupied slices, is achieved, as expected, due to the
W function. Applying the pipeline method, which utilizes
MixNibble operation as W function, improves the spatial
redundancy algorithm metrics with occupying just 235 slices
on Virtex-7.
Our intention in this paper is to propose reliability and error
detection mechanisms (through linear codes, recomputations,
and FST adopted for lightweight cryptography) to consider the
error detection schemes in designing beforehand taking into
account such algorithmic security. The MDS matrices applied
in the MixColumn (or MixNibble) transformation of ciphers
to protect ciphers against linear and differential attacks should
be incorporated in the cipher design in order to reduce the
overhead of the applied error detection schemes.
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Fig. 1. The FST approach with MDS matrices mapping function.
Algorithm 1 m×m MDS matrix design criteria.
Inputs: A : Fm2 → F
m
2 ; X = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ (F
m
2 )
n,
Outputs: Criteria of MDS matrix.
1. Define a linear diffusion L(X) = (
[
i= 1]n
∑
L1,i(xi), ...,
[
i=
1]n
∑
Ln,i(xi)), for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, and if L ◦ L = X, then it is
involutory.
2. Define the bundle weight of X, ωb(x) = |{xi : xi 6= 0, 1 ≤ i ≤
n}|,
3. Define the branch number of L: N = min{ωb(X) +
ωb(L(x))|X ∈ (F
m
2 )
n, X 6= 0}, and if N = n + 1, then it is
an MDS matrix.
II. ERROR DETECTION OF VLSI ARCHITECTURES FOR
MIXCOLUMN
MixColumn has a significant role to perform as the linear
diffusion layer in the encryption and decryption operations
over the finite fields. Although, there is a wide range of cat-
egories such as circulant, Hadamard, Cauchy, and Hadamard-
Cauchy for the MDS matrices to apply in MixColumn, choos-
ing an efficient MDS matrix should be carefully considered
in terms of low-cost hardware area, high diffusion speed, and
low-latency implementation. One of the common methods to
construct lightweight MDS matrices, e.g., circulant, is sparing
and compacting in implementation, and then composing it
several times in which it provides similar rows in matrices
to reduce the hardware implementation cost (number of XOR
gates, for instance) like Photon hash functions [12].
The design criteria of MDS matrices, e.g., based on a
low Hamming weight polynomial, generate a wide pool of
involutory and non-involutory MDS matrices. Moreover, the
security of these MDS matrices should be considered carefully
during the design phase to improve the security levels.
All types of MDS matrices offer optimal linear diffusion to
provide the proper linear part, the MixColumn operation in
block ciphers and hash functions, but in general, a compact
description for this matrix on which one is better may not
be very achievable. The criteria in [13] potentially lead to
low number of gates in hardware implementations and small
amount of memory usage. The m × m MDS matrix design
criteria are presented in Algorithm 1.
For each of the MDS matrices, we present the multiplication
and reduction operations with irreducible polynomials to count
the number of XOR gates. The number of XOR gates for
a number of lightweight block ciphers is presented in Table
I which also shows the overhead percentages (this table is
presented at the end of this section).
First cipher, Midori64, can utilize three 4×4 MDS matrices
for the MixColumn transformation. We investigate two of
them, i.e., the non-involutive MDS matrix (MB) and the
involutive almost MDS matrix (MC). The former one is the
same as the MDS matrix applied in KLEIN (will be shown in
more details), and the latter form, MC , is shown below. Let
us denote the input state of MixColumn as A and the output
state as R. Then, we have the following:
R =MC ×A =⇒


r0 r1 r2 r3
r4 r5 r6 r7
r8 r9 r10 r11
r12 r13 r14 r15

 =


0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0

×


a0 a1 a2 a3
a4 a5 a6 a7
a8 a9 a10 a11
a12 a13 a14 a15

 . (1)
According to above, we have modulo-2 added three input el-
ements of each column to generate each element of the output
matrix (R), in which each output column needs eight XOR
gates. Because of the fact that the coefficients of the input
state matrix are 0 or 1, we have the number of XOR gates as
eight and twelve XOR gates for cumulative column signature
and interleaved cumulative column signature, respectively, as
shown below.
r0 = a4 + a8 + a12,
r4 = a0 + a8 + a12,
r8 = a0 + a4 + a12,
r12 = a0 + a4 + a8. (2)
Let us modulo-2 add the first column of the state output matrix
to derive the cumulative column signature-based scheme.
r0 + r4 + r8 + r12 = (0 + 1 + 1 + 1)a0 + (1 + 0 + 1 + 1)a4
+ (1 + 1 + 0 + 1)a8 + (1 + 1 + 1 + 0)a12. (3)
For interleaved cumulative column signature, let us modulo-
2 add two even-row elements of the output state, i.e., rows 0
and 2, and two odd-row elements, i.e., rows 1 and 3:
r0 + r8 = (0 + 1)a0 + (1 + 1)a4 + (1 + 0)a8
+ (1 + 1)a12 = a0 + a8, (4)
r4 + r12 = (1 + 1)a0 + (0 + 1)a4 + (1 + 1)a8
+ (1 + 0)a3 = a4 + a12. (5)
As shown in Table I, we need 4×8 XOR gates in Midori64
with MC , in which the total number of cumulative column
signature gates is 4 × 3, and the required XOR gates for
interleaved cumulative column signature is 4× 2. Due to the
fact that these XOR gates are used in all of the MixColumn
transformations similarly, we do not count them in the table.
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The last cipher to present the details for the sake of
brevity, LED, applies a hardware-friendly MDS matrix for the
MixColumn transformation, that is given by:
M =


4 1 2 2
8 6 5 6
B E A 9
2 2 F B

 . (6)
Each entity in the input and the output state matrices is
a four-bit nibble. As a case study, to compute r0 (the first
element of the resultant matrix R), denoting the bits of the
elements of A as aij for ith bit of jth element, we have:
r0 = 4.a0+a4+2.a8+2.a12 = x
2.a0+a4+x.a8+x.a12, (7)
r0 = x
2.[a10x
3+a20x
2+a30x+a40]+[a14x
3+a24x
2+a34x
+a44] + x.[a18x
3 + a28x
2 + a38x+ a48] + x.[a1cx
3
+ a2cx
2 + a3cx+ a4c]. (8)
Using the irreducible polynomial X4 +X + 1 utilized for
reductions, one can derive the following for r0:
r0 = x
3.[a2c + a28 + a14 + a30] + x
2.[a10 + a40 + a24 + a38
+a3c] + x.[a10 + a20 + a34 + a18 + a48
+ a1c + a4c] + 1.[a20 + a44 + a1c + a18]. (9)
Let us derive the formulae for just one column signature
of MixColumn by modulo-2 adding the first column entries
r0, r4, r8, and r12. One can derive:
r4 = 8.a0 + 6.a4 + 5.a8 + 6.a12 = x
3.a0+
(x2 + x).a4 + (x
2 + 1).a8 + (x
2 + x).a12, (10)
r8 = B.a0 + E.a4 +A.a8 + 9.a12 = (x
3 + x+ 1).a0
+ (x3 + x2 + x).a4 + (x
3 + x).a8 + (x
3 + 1).a12, (11)
r12 = 2.a0 + 2.a4 + F.a8 +B.a12 =
x.a0 + x.a4 +(x
3 + x2 +x+1).a8 +(x
3 + x+1).a12. (12)
For the cumulative column signature-based scheme, we
modulo-2 add the first column entries of matrix R to derive
the following signature Pˆ :
r0 + r4 + r8 + r12 = (4+8+B+2).a0 +(1+ 6+E+2).a4
+(2 + 5 +A+ F ).a8 + (2 + 6 + 9 +B).a12
TABLE I
NUMBER OF GATES NEEDED FOR THE MIXCOLUMN TRANSFORMATION
AND DERIVING THE PREDICTED SIGNATURES IN DIFFERENT LIGHTWEIGHT
BLOCK CIPHERS
Block cipher
MixCol. CCS Inter. CCS
XOR XOR XOR
Midori64 (MC ) 128 176 (37.50%) 160 (25%)
Midori64 (MB) 256 304 (18.75%) 416 (62.50%)
LED 444 564 (27.02%) 672 (51.35%)
KLEIN (two-nibble) 256 304 (18.75%) 416 (62.50%)
= 5.a0 +B.a4 + 2.a8 + 6.a12. (13)
After the reduction, one can derive the below formulae as
the final form:
x3[a10 + a28 + a44 + a24 + a3c + a2c + a30] + x
2.[a10+
a40+a34+a38+a20+a4c+a3c+a1c+a14]+x.[a10+a20+
a30 + a44 + a48 + a14 + a18 + a2c + a24 + a4c]+
1.[a20 + a44 + a1c + a18 + a40 + a34 + a14 + a2c]. (14)
This can be generalized to other columns and thus we have
the followings for the second to the fourth columns after the
reductions:
r1 + r5 + r9 + r13 = 5.a1 +B.a5 + 2.a9 + 6.a13, (15)
r2 + r6 + r10 + r14 = 5.a2 +B.a6 + 2.a10 + 6.a14, (16)
r3 + r7 + r11 + r15 = 5.a3 +B.a7 + 2.a11 + 6.a15. (17)
In the following, the other signature-based scheme (in-
terleaved cumulative column signature) is derived through
modulo-2 adding the odd-row elements with each other and
the even ones as well:
r0 + r8 = F.a0 + F.a4 + 8.a8 +B.a12, (18)
r4 + r12 = A.a0 + 4.a4 +A.a8 +D.a12. (19)
According to these formulae, we are able to count the num-
ber of utilized XOR gates and the cumulative column signature
and interleaved cumulative column signature overheads for
LED which are presented in Table I. As mentioned above,
by default, for each cipher, we need 12 and 8 XOR gates
for cumulative column signature and interleaved cumulative
column signature, respectively, in addition to what presented,
which are omitted for the sake of brevity.
Finally, as mentioned before, we summarize the number of
XOR gates for all the mentioned ciphers in the MixColumn
transformation in Table I, in which the overhead percentages
are presented. We have not used sub-expression sharing,
similar to the S-boxes, for deriving the numbers in Table I;
nonetheless, sub-expression sharing can be used to reduce
the number of gates at the expense of possible high fan-
outs (which might not be tolerated in some cases, requiring
repeaters to resolve the problem). Table I and the MixColumn
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TABLE II
ASIC TSMC 65-NM SYNTHESIS RESULTS FOR TWO SELECT MIXCOLUMN
TRANSFORMATIONS AND THEIR ERROR DETECTION MECHANISMS
(CUMULATIVE COLUMN SIGNATURES: CCS)
Block Cipher
GE of Architectures
MixCol. CCS Inter. CCS
Midori, MC 272 330 (21.3%) 317 (16.5%)
LED 575 746 (29.7%) 765 (33.0%)
transformations that we have not considered for the sake of
brevity motivate the urgency of considering the overheads
beforehand, perhaps as a design factor (we note that other error
detection schemes can be considered and the ones provided
here are just a subset).
Similar to the S-boxes, we present two metrics for analyzing
the results in Table I. The first one is the overhead for
our error detection schemes shown in Table I. As seen in
this table, Midori64, which applies the MC matrix, has the
lowest-cost for the MixColumn implementation; nevertheless,
the cumulative column signature-based scheme overhead of
this matrix is more than other ones. Comparing the percent
overheads in Table I shows how different they could be with
respect to error detection using cumulative column signature
(and other schemes for error detection). The second metric
is the total number of gates (the original and the add-on
detection), e.g., the number of applied logic gates of MB is
not as low as MC .
Finally, through ASIC synthesis and for two select construc-
tions in Table II, we present the areas for the MixColumn
transformations of Midori (MC) and LED. The benchmarking
is done for the error detection architectures using TSMC
65-nm library and Synopsys Design Compiler. Similar to
the S-boxes, in order to make the area results meaningful
when switching technologies on ASIC, we have provided
the NAND-gate equivalency (gate equivalents: GE). This is
performed using the area of a NAND gate in the utilized
TSMC 65-nm CMOS library which is 1.41 µm2. The results
are shown in Table II, where the overheads are presented
in parentheses (the contrast when comparing this table and
Table I is because of the optimizations performed in Design
Compiler, noting that we have not performed sub-expression
sharing in Table I). The aforementioned metrics/overheads are
some of the possible indications to give designers the required
criteria to predict low-cost MixColumn implementations for
lightweight ciphers.
III. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we evaluated the hardware complexities
of the MixColumn transformations to propose a framework
for design-for lightweight and effective countermeasures for
intentional and natural faults in crypto-architectures and to
present respective motivations. One can also base the crite-
ria (depending on the objectives) on other performance and
implementation metrics, e.g., delay (frequency, throughput,
efficiency), power consumption, and energy. Although we
chose the MixColumn transformation due to their importance,
other less costly transformations can be considered. The results
of our VLSI implementations on ASIC platform shows the
diversity of MixColumn in lightweight cryptography, calling
for efficient approaches for error detection. Finally, one could
consider a subset of fault attacks, differential fault intensity
analysis (DFIA), see for instance, [14], [15], [16], which com-
bines differential power analysis with fault injection principles
to obtain biased fault models (multi-byte faults cannot be
used practically for attacking time redundancy countermeasure
implementations, and single-byte fault models are the only
viable option for the attackers).
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